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Both the IPO literature and cross listing literature document that soon after the overseas listing of 
IPOs, the results are negative abnormal returns, and that phenomenon are “ post listing anomaly”. 
This paper checks whether there is a post listing anomaly and tries to find reasons for it. The paper 
concludes that the post listing anomaly does not exist. Further, some companies time the market 
while others do not when they consider listing their IPOs overseas. 




One of the most significant anomalies in the financial markets is that stock prices seem to rise just 
before listing, but they drop after listing and continue to decline for some companies some time. 
Companies’ cite reasons for cross-listing on several criterions such as an expansion of their 
prestige, stock visibility, the effect of signaling, and the development of liquidity and managers 
preferences. The study tries to answer is there a post listing anomaly? The study approaches this 
question through the relationship between cross-listing decisions and post listing returns. This 
paper aims to expand the realm of cross-listing and IPO (initial public offerings) studies by 
including a broader perspective that allows for analyzing the motives of cross-listing decisions in 
the IPO case. The study uses an event study that includes 89 companies from 15 different countries. 
The study begins with a review of the literature concerning cross-listing, and the topics examined 
in terms of the reasons to cross-list, and attempts to explain the short term anomaly of negative post 
listing abnormal returns through the lens cross-listing and using IPO firms. My methodology 
involved examining the relationship between post listing abnormal returns and the initial IPO 
cross-listing decision. In the cross-listing literature, the main theme that emerged is most 
companies achieve significant negative abnormal returns after they cross-list, referred to in the 
literature as the post listing anomaly. In the IPO literature, the main argument that most companies’ 
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achieve significant positive abnormal returns on the first day of the IPO and long run negative 
abnormal returns. One could stay there, but then that raises another question, why does such an 
anomalies exist, if they certainly do. Instead, if the study wants to answer the combined questions 
of why IPO companies’ cross-list and why there is a “post listing anomaly” then a connection 
between those two questions can be explored. To get an answer, the study developed a common 
factor between those two questions, which is “the host market condition”. The study uses the 
market index return for the S&P 500 because it gauges the health of the market condition, and used 
Portfolio Matching (PM) because the latest research recommended the use of PM index in 
analyzing IPOs. The study developed 4 hypotheses to assess whether there is a post listing anomaly 
or whether there are some companies that time the market. The study uses a wide range of 
parametric and non parametric tests to evaluate each of the hypotheses, and the motivation to do so 
is the distribution properties of the daily stock returns, as they do not follow the normal distribution 
characteristics. The study uses the Fama-French approach to investigate the possibility of whether 
the market model is the best one to use to calculate the abnormal returns. 
 
This study found that there is neither a post listing anomaly nor there is an IPO anomaly. The 
abnormal returns after post listing and IPO can be explained through the host market conditions 
and linked to a conclusion about market timing decisions by managers. This paper proposes it 
proposes an attempt to explore the motives of cross-listing companies and explain the “IPO 
anomaly”. Second, the study goes beyond documenting abnormal returns behavior and relates that 




Companies have different motives to launch their IPO in different countries through the process of 
cross-listing. According to Merton (1987), the market value of companies share will go up with an 
increase of investor’s base and that explains someone’s desire to list overseas. Pagano et al. (2002) 
and Leuz et al. (2006) find that companies listing abroad to have better access to foreign markets. 
Karolyi’s (2006), model describes another channel through which a cross-listing could affect a 
company value, which he called the information channel. This result is notable as some researchers 
document such a premium for companies cross-listed in the United States (e.g. Doidge et al. 2004; 
King and Segal, 2006). They also show that the cross-listing premium persists when they control 
for the size of growth opportunities. While the main benefits of the US listing stem from the ability 
of the non US firms to access the US common equity markets, such gains tend to be economically 
significant in the short run, and dissipate in the long run. Sarkissian and Schill, (2008) report that 
overseas listing offer temporary value gains. Karolyi, (2006); King, (2007) document other theories 
that explain reasons for overseas listing such as the bonding hypothesis, investor recognition, and 
market segmentation. Empirically it has been difficult to distinguish among different theories. 
 






Miller, (1999) documents equity capital raised in the US tend to have higher abnormal returns 
surrounding the US listing announcements, and conclude that the evidence is consistent with 
market segmentation. Coffee (2002), however, argues that this evidence supports the bonding 
hypothesis because emerging markets have weaker investor protection, and firms from such 
markets get more credibility by submitting to the US legal system. Foerster and Karolyi, (1999) 
provide evidence consistent with managers’ strategic market timing to utilize better market 
valuations, and investor awareness. Merjos, (1963, 1967) investigated the price behavior of newly 
listed stocks three months before listing and one month after listing. She found that the sample 
outperformed the market in the three month period before listing, but underperformed the market 
during one month period after listing. Reints and Vandenberg,  (1975) argued  “in an efficient 
capital market”, the act of listing should not affect a company’s systematic risk level, and their 
study employing the Chow test found no significant change in the stock’s systematic risk after 
listing. Subsequently, Fabozzi and Hershkoff (1979) confirmed those results. Ying et al. (1977) 
employed the Fama-MacBeth procedure and found a significant increase in pre-listing price, with, 
however, only a modest reduction in post listing. Sanger and McConnell, (1987) documented that 
stocks, on average, earn positive abnormal returns before listing and negative abnormal returns 
over the four-to-six-week period immediately following listing. 
 
Hwang and Jayaraman, (1993) investigated whether the negative post listing anomaly is a global 
phenomenon and whether the differences in the market-making components explain the anomaly. 
Although the abnormal returns for the entire sample were significantly positive, because of the 
IPOs. The post listing returns form for the non IPO companies was negative. Dharan and Ikenberry, 
(1995) hypothesized that executive’s time the market and documented significant negative 
abnormal returns for up to 36 months after listing. One intriguing question then to consider is 
whether there is some reasonable path dependence in the cross-listings process across companies 
and over time. One could argue that these cross-listings may come to symbolize more of a 
corporate decision. Market segmentation hypothesis argues that the major benefits for US listing 
arise from mitigating the effects of investments barriers, such as differences in the accounting 
information and disclosures across countries, which segment capital markets across national 
boundaries. Stapleton and Subrahmanyam, (1977); Errunza and Losq, (1985); Alexander et al. 
(1987) the goal of companies who list overseas is to reduce their cost of capital. Merton’s (1987) 
developed the investor recognition hypothesis, which assumes that investors invest only in firms 
they know about, and imply that the expected rate of return on a stock has a negative correlation 
with the size of the company’s investor base. According to this hypothesis, a US listing enhances 
firm value because it increases firm visibility and name recognition, which in turn potentially 
increases the listing firm’s shareholder base relative to its domestic listed peers. Several studies 
report a higher analyst following for non US firms that raise equity in the US. Baker et al. (2002) 
document that listing in US has more analyst reports and more business media attention. Forester 
and Karolyi, (1999) document that those firms raising equity simultaneously with a cross-listing 






have a more favorable price impact in the short run and a less severe decline in the post listing 
period, compared to their non capital raising peers. Thus, the investor recognition hypothesis 
predicts a higher post listing performance. 
 
The bonding hypothesis argues that the benefits of cross-listing on the US stock exchanges stem 
from enhanced investor protection and the reduced agency costs of controlling shareholders 
because the firm bonds itself to the enforcement powers of the US SEC and the US Federal 
securities laws (Coffee, 1999, 2002; Stulz, 1999). Doidge et al. (2004) argue that non US firms 
follow the US legal system via listing “on stock exchanges” to support their growth opportunities. 
The theory predicts higher valuation effects for firms from countries with poor quality of investor 
protection (Doidge et al. 2004). The window-of-opportunity hypothesis assumes asymmetric 
information between investors and managers select the timing of exchange listing to take advantage 
of temporarily favorable market conditions. According to (Dharan, 1995; Alexander et al. 1987; 
Forester and Karolyi, 1999; Mittoo, 2003) there are pre-listing prices run up and that results in 
positive abnormal returns that quickly change to negative abnormal returns after listing. Extant 
evidence shows that IPOs occur in waves, and tend to cluster during booming industry and market 
valuations. Accordingly, the hypothesis predicts a clustering, and a more negative performance for 
the IPOs listed during the Internet bubble period (during 1999–2000). The business strategy 
hypothesis suggests that the US listing decision is a part of the company’s business strategy, which 
could include business or financing considerations or both. Pagano et al. (2002) suggest that a US 
listing has several advantages such as advances in the firm’s competitive position and reputation. 
Fanto and Karmel, (1997) report that executives of foreign firms consider their US business as a 
significant driving factor while Bancel and Mittoo, (2001) find that about 16% of European 
managers surveyed cite the easier implementation of global business strategy as an important factor 
in their US listing decision. 
 
It is suggested by Chemmanur, (1999); Maksimovic, (2001) that going public is a way to raise 
capital to support its growth opportunities. Krigman, et al. (1999); McDonald, (1972); Loughran 
and Ritter, (2004) document that IPOs produce positive abnormal performances on or around the 
listing period and then become negative after that. The investing public may cause abnormal 
performance because they are acting irrationally when attempting to evaluate IPOs. Garfinkle et al. 
(2002) report that this irrational view may occur because the investors know about the historical 
pricing anomaly (short term abnormally positive performance) and in turn demand for IPOs is 
abnormally high, which pushes up the prices. Schultz, (2003) illustrates how the number of IPOs 
issued increases as the market peaks this pseudo-timing incident illustrates how IPOs become 












This study aims to answer why companies cross-list in terms of the post listing abnormal returns; 
the research first examines whether the “post listing IPO anomaly” exists. 
 
H0: Post listing anomaly exists 
HA: Post listing anomaly does not exist 
 
It is necessary to consider when the article mention anomaly, the study refer to the fact that post 
listing CAAR (Cumulative average abnormal return) is a negative, which confirms the prevailing 
idea of the anomaly. However if, after the IPO listing overseas  there is a positive CAAR then there 
is no anomaly. Then the paper moved to the second set of hypotheses as such: 
 
H1A: Some companies time the market 
H1B: Some companies do not time the market 
 
The second set of hypotheses continues from the same perspective, but in this case, the focus on the 
relationship between host market condition, the CAAR, and managerial decisions. Two cases come 
under this set of hypotheses. The first case is where the host market environment is positive, yet the 
CAAR is negative. The second case where the host market condition is negative, yet CAAR are 
positive. In the first case, I hypothesize that those companies who list in favorable market 
conditions time the market and market participants know that or else why they realize negative 
abnormal returns. In the second case, I hypothesize that those who list in unfavorable market 
conditions do not time the market, and market participants can recognize the true value for the 
company such that the companies’ achieve positive post listing abnormal returns despite 
unfavorable host market condition. This article did not address how market participants recognized 
the true value of the company because that is not the domain of this paper. That question is for 





This study uses the event study methodology, because of the vast number of research projects that 
have applied the methodology, the event study methodology is the preferred method employed by 
researchers attempting to examine questions related to market efficiency. The event study 
methodology is the historically accepted method used when attempting analyzing a IPOs 
performance from both short- and long-term event windows (see Bradley et al. 2003; Ibbotson, 
1975; Ritter, 1992). Fama, (1976) documents that daily returns are not normally distributed. Brown 
and Warner, (1985) indicate that this also the case for excess returns based on daily data. However, 






this point need not necessarily bias the hypothesis test toward type I error. (Brown and Warner, 
1980, 1985) provide evidence that the t-test is an accurate test for the presence of abnormal 
performance, despite the non normality of the distribution of daily residuals. Sanger and Peterson, 
(1990) report that tests using daily returns are more powerful than those using monthly returns, and 
the non normality of stock returns has little effect upon properties of test statistics. Implicit in the t-
tests that evaluate the abnormal returns a number of strong assumptions that could be violated. 
Hence, the paper used non parametric tests that require less restrictive assumptions than the t-test; 
these include: the sign test and the Wilcoxon signed rank test (Kaplan and Roll, 1972; Collins, 
1979). The study explored the basic statistical measures for variable  . Table-1 report that the 
average daily stock returns for my sample is - 0.00021, with a standard deviation of 0.05616. Next, 
the study examined the significance of the variable  , with a p-value of <0.0001, which shows that 
the average daily stock returns is significantly different from zero. The study also examined the 
goodness-of-fit daily returns against normal distribution based on Kolmogorov–Smirnov (D = 
0.1478) with a p-value of (0.01), and the study reject the null hypothesis and conclude that daily 
returns are not normally distributed. The Cramer–von Mises and Anderson–Darling tests also result 
in a p-value less than 0.05, which confirms the conclusion that the data are not normally 
distributed. Table-1 reports that the average daily stock returns for the sample is - 0.00021, with a 
standard deviation of 0.056. 
 
Table-1. Basic Statistic 
Basic Statistical Measures 
Location Variability 
Mean -0.00021 Std Deviation 0.05616 
Median 0.00000 Variance 0.00315 
Mode 0.00000 Range 4.53852 
  Inter-quartile Range 0.03367 
 
Table-2. Tests for Location 
Tests for Location: Mu0=0 
Test Statistic P-Value 
Student’s t T -1.0722 Pr> |t| 0.2836 
Sign M -813 Pr>= |M| <.0001 
Signed Rank S -1.771E7 Pr>= |S| 0.0048 
 
Table-3. Goodness of Fit Test 
Goodness-of-Fit Tests for Normal Distribution 
Test Statistic P-Value 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.14783 Pr> D <0.010 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 919.86252 Pr> W-Sq <0.005 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 4999.90443 Pr> A-Sq <0.005 
 
Table-2 examines the significance of the variable  ,p-value of <0.0001, and shows that the average 
daily stock returns is significantly different from zero. Tsble-3 shows Kolmogorov-Smirnov is 






significant with a p-value <0.0001 such that the daily returns are not normally distributed. The 
Cramer–von Mises and Anderson–Darling tests also result in a p-value < 0.0005, which confirms 
the conclusion that the daily return data are not normally distributed. 
 
Abnormal Returns Estimation 
The next step is to calculate abnormal return, but before abnormal returns can be measured, a 
benchmark used to define normal returns must be specified. In theory, the correct identification of 
the “true” return generating process is essential in event studies. There are 5 standard models the 
study considered: Mean Adjusted Returns, Market Adjusted Returns, Control Portfolios or PM, 
Risk Adjusted Returns and Fama-French model. Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) find that the 
average adjusted returns measure often works and provide the same results as complex models do. 
In a more detailed comparison, Dyckman et al. (1984) find that the risk adjusted process is better. 
This paper uses risk adjusted expected return generating model, but to tackle the problem of non 
synchronous trading, the literature suggested two methods. These methods are the Scholes and 
Williams (1977) beta (SW) and the Dimson (1979) beta. Fowler and Rorke, (1983) demonstrate the 
effectiveness of these two methods to be relatively equivalent. According to Reinganum (1982), 
and Theobald (1983) when SW beta or Dimson beta compared to the standard Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) method, the SW and Dimson betas produce no more powerful results than the OLS 
beta. Moreover, Bartholdy and Riding (1994) conclude that OLS outperforms these two methods of 
beta calculation, thus attenuating the case that methods beyond the traditional OLS method should 
be used. Abnormal returns are the actual ex post return of security over the event window minus 
the normal return of the company over the event period. The normal return is the return that would 
be expected if the event did not take place. For each company   and event date :  
 
   
       {   |  }       (1) 
 
Where    
               ) are the abnormal, actual, and normal returns, respectively, for period 
     represents the conditioning information for the model. IPOs lack estimation period that give 
the researcher with a model of normalized returns, so in many ways IPOs event studies differ from 
the standard event study (Campbell et al. 1997). Initially, researchers compared IPO returns to 
standard benchmarks (e.g. Russell 3000 Index, or S&P 500), but this was ineffective when they 
attempted to analyze IPO performance because IPOs lack the past performance. So to create an 
accurate benchmark, without using historical data, researchers have constructed portfolios or 
matched the event firm to a non event company because they are more accurate than simply 
matching the event firm to a standard market index, and reducing the beta coefficient. Several 
researchers used different methods as such Brav (1997) and Carter (1998) used the PM approach 
while Bhabra (2003) and Perfect (1997) used the MF approach, while, Ritter (1991) used both the 
MF and PM approach. This study used two strategies:  (a) The S&P500 index to follow the practice 
of using the market index in event study methodology; (b) the PM method which uses external 






portfolios to match the firms to similar portfolios with similar likeness. For each month, the study 
calculates average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) 
using the standard event study methodology and exclude firms that have missing data either on 
prices or dividends. 
 
The research conducted several checks to verify the IPO status of a firm. First the study ensures 
that the IPO firm has no trading history in DataStream prior to US listing date on any stock 
exchange. Firms with the stock returns data prior to the listing period are not in the sample. Second, 
the study also examines other data sources, including Edgar electronic filings, Bloomberg, and 
individual company websites to confirm the IPO status. The host market condition is a feature that 
will allow the study to assess the hypotheses. The study defines the host market condition proxy, 
      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅      , as the average S&P500 index return for the post listing period of (0 to +50) days 
or         . The study chose this average index return as an indicator of the host market 
environment as either a positive or a negative. Since the article is using the market model to 
estimate the normal return and used the daily index returns as the proxy for the market portfolio, 
then by definition the estimated normal return will reflect those host market conditions. In doing 
so, the estimated abnormal return should also reflect those host market conditions. As described 
earlier the paper used the OLS method to determine the market model
2
 parameters using the either 
S&P500 daily index returns or (PM)         as a proxy for the market portfolio returns. The study 
considered the aggregation of CAAR to follow the guidance of Dyckman et al. (1984). The 
aggregation is along two dimensions—over time and across securities. The study considered 
aggregation over time for a single security and then considered aggregation both across securities 
and over time. 
 
Data 
The study conducted the research from 2002 to 2008. The study chose this time to perform analysis 
on the most recent data available. The study uses companies who chose the U.S market for their 
IPO. There are 89 firms and 15 different countries in the sample. Table-4 shows the list of 
countries used in the sample, their daily average return, and the corresponding host market index 
return (S&P500). The table also shows that the sample has 2,340 observations with a 0.0041 average 
daily return for the IPO companies that listed in the US market.  The study conducted the research 
from 2002 to 2008. The study uses companies who chose the U.S market for their IPO. There are 
89 firms and 15 different countries in the sample. Table-4 shows the list of countries used in the 
sample, their daily average return, and the corresponding host market index return (S&P500). The 
table also shows that the sample has 2,340 observations with a 0.0041 average daily return for the 
IPO companies that listed in the US market. 
 
 
                                                 
2 See appendix A.1 for a complete description of the econometrics of estimating the market model using OLS. 






Table-4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Daily Domestic Return Host Market Index Return 
Mean StdDev # Obs Mean StdDev # Obs 
Country 
.00016 .01824 30 .30233 .95781 30 London 
Bermuda .00064 .03296 180 .09242 .78735 198 
Canada .00354 .03269 60 -.0440 1.0345 60 
India .01065 .04430 30 -.0717 .38237 30 
Mexico .00403 .04258 90 .21283 1.0388 120 
Israel .00337 .04631 180 -.0418 .74243 180 
KOREA -.0025 .02392 60 .08900 .49604 60 
TAIWAN .00026 .03203 60 .06000 .44788 60 
China .00719 .12402 1,140 .08559 .74199 1,200 
Netherland .00781 .03467 60 -.0353 .52551 60 
Brazil -.0014 .01522 60 -.0393 .52491 60 
Greece -.0031 .02561 300 .11380 .73073 300 
Argentina .00797 .03603 30 -.0363 .53614 30 
SPAIN .01065 .03637 30 -.0373 .63610 30 
COLOMBIA -.0104 .06506 30 .34733 1.6781 30 
Total .00401 .09015 2,340 .08191 .78805 2,508 
 
Statistical Tests 
The literature refers to the Patell test as the standardized abnormal return measure or a test 
assuming cross-sectional independence. Many published studies use the Patell test (Linn and 
McConnell, 1983; Schipper and Smith, 1986; Haw et al. 1990). Since, there is serial dependence in 
the CAAR, so I used Mikkelson and Partch (1988) adjustment to get the test statistic. The corrected 
test accounts for the serial correlation of CAAR in the test window. I used the corrected test to 
follow other researchers like Mais et al. (1989), Cowan et al. (1990), Mann and Sicherman (1991) 
who used the same procedure. Events are endogenous, reflecting a company’s self-selection in 
choosing the event, which in turn reflects insider information. In acknowledging these factors, it 
can be observed that the unexpected information provided by an event determines stock price 
effects. Therefore, standard estimates of cross-sectional coefficients can be biased (Eckbo et al. 
(1990). For such a situation, Sefcik and Thompson (1986) assess the statistical properties of cross-
sectional regressions. They argue that accounting for cross-sectional correlated CAAR and 
heteroscedasticity in the abnormal returns is potentially crucial for inferences. Boehmer et al. 
(1991) introduce the standardized cross-section test and report its observed properties. The test is 
the same as the Patell test except that there is an empirical cross-sectional variance adjustment in 
place of the analytical variance of the total standardized prediction error (Sanders and Robins, 
1991). Brown and Warner (1985) report that the cross-sectional test is well-specified for event date 
variance, but not particularly convincing; however, Boehmer et al. (1991) report that the 
standardized cross-sectional test is more powerful and equally well-specified. The study used the 
transformed normal test to correct for skewness Hall, (1992). 
 
The paper used non parametric tests to avoid the misspecification errors that occur when using 
parametric tests. The sign test is a non parametric test, and its weakness is that it may not be well-






specified if the distribution of CAAR is skewed as can be the case with daily data. With skewed 
CAAR, the expected percentage of positive cumulative CAAR can differ from one-half even under 
the null hypothesis. Frank Wilcoxon (1892–1965) designed the Wilcoxon test to improve on the 
sign test. Another test the article uses is the generalized Z test. For each window, the study reports 
the number of securities with positive and negative CAAR, the null hypothesis for the generalized 
sign test is that the ratio of positive returns is the same as the ratio of positive returns  in the 
estimation period. Corrado, (1989) describes the rank test for a one-day event window. The ranks 
of the CAAR of different days are dependent by construction. However, the result of ignoring the 
dependence should be trivial for short-event windows. The rank test extends to multiple-day 
windows by assuming that the daily return ranks within the window are independent. The rank test 
procedure treats the combined estimation period and event period as a single set of returns and 
assigns a rank to each day. 
 
Empirical Results 
Table-5 shows the results of testing in which the post listing anomaly exists, that is, there are 
significant negative post listing CAAR. The study reports that in the days of (11, +50) post listing 
period, the average cumulative abnormal return is–15.94%, and is significant at 0.1% level, for 
Patel test, a time-series cross-sectional test (hereafter, TCS), signed rank test, a skewness corrected 
t-test (hereafter, SCT), and some other parametric and non parametric tests. Based on those results, 
the study concludes that the post listing anomaly exists for some companies which supports 
hypothesis H0: Post listing anomaly exists. Table-5 shows the results of testing in which the post 
listing anomaly exists, that is, there are significant negative post listing CAAR. The study reports 
that in the days of (11, +50) post listing period, the average cumulative abnormal return is–15.94%, 
and is significant at 0.1% level, for Patel test, a time-series cross-sectional test (hereafter, TCS), 
signed rank test, a skewness corrected t-test (hereafter, SCT), and some other parametric and non 
parametric tests. Based on those results, the study concludes that the post listing anomaly exists for 
some companies which supports hypothesis H0: Post listing anomaly exists. Figure-1 depicts how 
CAAR behave during the window of (–50, +50) when using the (S&P500) market index benchmark. 
Figure-1 shows a negative post listing CAAR over the window of (11, +50), which confirms the 
hypothesis that the post listing anomaly does exist. Figure-1 depicts how CAAR behave during the 
window of (–50, +50) when using the (S&P500) market index benchmark. Figure 1 shows a 
negative post listing CAAR over the window of (11, +50), which confirms the hypothesis that the 
post listing anomaly does exist. Table-6 shows the results of testing in which the post listing 
anomaly does not exist, that is, there are significant positive post listing CAAR. The study reports 
that in the days of (11, +50) “the post listing period”, the  CAAR is 10.84% and is significant at 
0.1% level, for Patel test, TCS, signed rank test, a SCT, and a Z -standardized cross-sectional test 
(hereafter, ZSTD). Based on those results, the study concludes that the post listing anomaly does 
not exist for some companies, which casts doubt on the validity of the anomaly, because some 






companies do not show such an anomaly, which supports hypothesis HA: Post listing 
anomaly does not exist.  
 
Table-5. Market Model 
 
 
Figue-1. Market Index  
 
Table-6 shows the results of testing in which the post listing anomaly does not exist, that is, there 
are significant positive post listing CAAR. The paper reports  “in the days of (11, +50) post listing 
period”, the average cumulative abnormal return is 10.84% and is significant at 0.1% level, for 
Patel test, TCS, signed rank test, a SCT, and a Z -standardized cross-sectional test (hereafter, 
ZSTD). Based on those results, the study concludes that the post listing anomaly does not exist for 
some companies, which casts doubt on the validity of the anomaly because some companies do not 
show such an anomaly, which supports hypothesis HA: Post listing anomaly does not exist. Figure-
2 depicts how CAAR behave during the window of (–50, +50) when using the (S&P500) market 
index benchmark. Figure 2 shows a positive post listing CAAR over the window of (11, +50), 
which confirms the hypothesis that the post listing anomaly does not exist. 






Table-6. Market Model 
 
Figue-2. Market Index  
 
Figure-2 depicts how CAAR behave during the window of (–50, +50) when using the (S&P500) 
market index benchmark. Figure-2 shows a positive post listing CAAR over the window of (11, 
+50), which confirms the hypothesis that the post listing anomaly does not exist. The next step of 
the research is testing whether some companies time the market, while others do not. In doing so 
and as explained earlier in the research method, the study connects the post listing anomaly and 
market timing through the host market condition. That is the analysis is twofold. First, the post 
listing anomaly exists, while the host market condition is a positive. Second, the post–listing 
anomaly does not exist while the host market condition is a negative. Table-7 shows the 
circumstances in which the host market condition is a positive given by the (S&P500) index over the 
period (0, +50). The study reports that in the period of (11, +50), the average cumulative abnormal 
return is–26.19% and is significant at 0.1% level, for Patel test, TCS, signed rank test, a SCT, and, 
ZSTD test. The study concludes that since the host market condition is a positive and the post 






listing abnormal return is a negative (post listing anomaly), then the host market condition does not 
explain the anomaly, and those companies time the market. The study made that assessment 
because the market has favorable conditions therefore the post listing CAAR should have been 
positive. The study explains the negative post listing CAAR as a reflection that the market 
participants have recognized that those companies’ motives for cross-listing were nothing more 
than taking advantage of an up-market (market timing), which supports hypothesis H1A: Some 
companies time the market. Figure-3 depicts how CAAR behave during the window of (–50, +50) 
when using the (S&P500) market index benchmark. Figure-3 shows a negative post listing CAAR 
over the window of (11, +50) while the host market condition is a positive, which confirms the 
hypothesis that the post listing anomaly does exist, but can be explained in the context of market 
timing. 
Table-7.  Market Model 
 
Table-7 shows the circumstances in which the host market condition is a positive given by the 
(S&P500) index over the period (0, +50). The study reports that in the period (11, +50), the average 
cumulative abnormal return is–26.19% and is significant at 0.1% level, for Patel test, TCS, signed 
rank test, a SCT, and, ZSTD test. The study concludes that since the host market condition is a 
positive and the post listing abnormal return is a negative (post listing anomaly), and the host 
market condition does not explain the anomaly, and those companies time the market, which 
supports hypothesis H1A: Some companies time the market. Figure-3 depicts how CAAR behave 
during the window of (–50, +50) when using the (S&P500) market index benchmark. Figure 3 
shows a negative post listing CAAR over the window of (11, +50) while the host market condition 






is a positive, which confirms the hypothesis that the post listing anomaly does exist, but can be 
explained in the context of market timing. 
 
Figure-3. Market Index 
 
Table-8 shows the circumstances in which the host market condition is a negative given by 
(S&P500) index over the period (0, +50). The study reports “in the period (11, +50)” the CAAR is 
17.65% and is significant at 0.1% level, for Patel test, TCS, signed rank test, a SCT, and, ZSTD 
test. The study concludes that since the host market condition is a negative and the post listing 
abnormal return is a positive then there is no post listing anomaly. Since that the host market 
condition cannot explain the positive CAAR for those companies, the study can conclude that these 
companies do not time the market because they cannot be timing a market that is negative. H1B: 
Some companies do not time the market. Table-8 shows the circumstances in which the host 
market condition is a negative given by (S&P500) index over the period (0, +50). The research 
reports “in the period (11, +50)” the average cumulative abnormal is 17.54% and is significant at 
0.1% level, for Patel test, TCS, signed rank test, a SCT, and, ZSTD test. The study concludes that 
since the host market condition is a negative and the post listing abnormal return is a positive then 
there is no post listing anomaly. Since that the host market condition cannot explain the positive 
CAAR for those companies, The study can conclude that these companies do not time the market 
because they cannot be timing a market that is negative “which supports hypothesis” H1B: Some 
companies do not time the market. Figure-4 depicts how CAAR behave during the window of (–50, 
+50) when using the (S&P500) market index benchmark. Figure-4 shows a positive post listing 
CAAR over the window of (11, +50) while the host market condition is a negative, which confirms 
the hypothesis that the post listing anomaly does not exist and that those companies do not time the 
market, and that may be the reason that they have achieved  positive abnormal returns after IPO 
listing. Figure-4 depicts how CAAR behave during the window of (–50, +50) when using the 
(S&P500) market index benchmark. Figure 4 shows a positive post listing CAAR over the window 
of (11, +50) while the host market condition is a negative, which confirms the hypothesis that the 
post listing anomaly does not exist and that those companies do not time the market, and that may 
be the reason that they have achieved  positive abnormal returns after IPO listing. 






Table-8.  Market Model 
 
 
Figure-4. Market Index 
 
The study redid the same analysis performed earlier but using the PM approach as the bench 
market to calculate the CAAR. Table 9 shows the circumstances in which the host market condition 
is a positive given by the average returns of the (PM) index over the period (0, +50). The study 
report that in the period of (11, +50), the average cumulative abnormal return is–18.87% and is 
significant at 0.1% level, for Patel test, TCS signed rank test, a SCT, and, ZSTD test. The study 
concludes that since the host market condition is a positive and the post listing abnormal return is a 
negative (post listing anomaly), then the host market condition does not explain the anomaly, and 
those companies time the market. The study concludes that the reason those companies did not 
achieve positive post listing CAAR is the market participants have recognized that those 
companies’ motives for cross-listing were nothing more than taking advantage of an up-market 






(market timing). Table-9 shows the circumstances in which the host market condition is a negative 
given by (PM) index over the period (0, +50). The study reports “in the period of (11, +50)” the 
average cumulative abnormal return is 13.58% and is significant at 0.1% level, for Patel test, TCS, 
signed rank test, a SCT, and, ZSTD test. The study concludes that since the host market condition 
is a negative and the post listing abnormal return is a positive then there is no post listing anomaly. 
Since that the host market condition cannot explain the positive CAAR for those companies, the 
study concludes that these companies do not time the market because they cannot be timing a 
market that is negative. 
 
Table-9.  Market Model 
 
 
Table-10.  Market Model 
 






Table-10 shows the circumstances in which the host market condition is a negative given by (PM) 
index over the period (0, +50). The paper reports “in the period (11, +50)” the average cumulative 
abnormal is 13.58% and is significant at 0.1% level, for Patel test, TCS, signed rank test, a SCT, 
and, ZSTD test. The study concludes that since the host market condition is a negative and the post 
listing abnormal return is a positive then there is no post listing anomaly. Since that the host market 
condition cannot explain the positive CAAR for those companies. The study can conclude that 
these companies do not time the market because they cannot be timing a market that is negative.  
H1B: Some companies do not time the market 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS (FAMA-FRENCH ESTIMATION PROCEDURE) 
 
Fama and French, (1992) and Lakonishok et al. (1994) note that stock returns tend to be associated 
with company size as well as with BTM (book to market) ratios. To complement testing the 
hypothesis in this study, the study employed three-factor models, as the return generating process. 
The model is constructed as following:  
 
                               .   (16) 
 
Then the paper defines the abnormal return for the common stock     company on day   as:  
 
                     ̂    ̂       ̂       ̂        (17) 
 
Where the coefficients ̂ , ̂ ,  ̂ , and  ̂  are the OLS estimates of   ,  , ̂ , and     (see Fama-French, 
1993) for a detailed description of the model. As discussed in the section on research methodology, 
the study used another estimation procedure apart from the market model to estimate CAAR, the 
Fama-French procedure, in which they control for size and BTM ratio. Table-11 to 14 show that 
some companies time the market for their IPO listing overseas while other companies do not, 
therefore the study reaches the same conclusions reached by using the S&P500 index. Table-11 
shows the results of testing in which the post listing anomaly exists, that is, there are significant 
negative post listing CAAR and using Fama-French approach instead of risk adjusted market 
returns because FF controls for size and BTM. The study reports that in the days of (11, +50) post 
listing period, the average cumulative abnormal return is–9.94%, and is significant at 0.1% level, 
for Patel test, a time-series cross-sectional test (hereafter, TCS), signed rank test, a skewness 
corrected t-test (hereafter, SCT), and some other parametric and non parametric tests. Based on 
those results, the study concludes that the post listing anomaly exists for some companies which 










Table-11. Fama-French Time Series Model 
 
Table-12 shows the results of testing in which the post listing anomaly does not exist, that is, there 
are significant positive post listing CAAR and using Fama-French approach instead of risk adjusted 
market returns, because FF controls for size and BTM. The paper reports “in the days (0, +50)” 
post listing period the average cumulative abnormal return is 11.51% and is significant at 0.1% 
level, for Patel test, TCS, signed rank test, a SCT, and a Z -standardized cross-sectional test 
(hereafter, ZSTD). Based on those results, the study concludes that the post listing anomaly does 
not exist for some companies, which casts doubt on the validity of the anomaly because some 
companies do not show such an anomaly, which supports hypothesis; HA: Post listing anomaly 
does not exist. 
Table-12. Fama-French Time Series Model 
 
 
Table-13 shows the circumstances in which the host market condition is a positive given by the 
average returns of the (PM) index over the period of (0, +50) and using Fama-French approach 
instead of risk adjusted market returns because FF controls for size and BTM. The study reports 






that in the period of (11, +50), the average cumulative abnormal return is–16.6% and is significant 
at 0.1% level, for Patel test, TCS, signed rank test, a SCT, and, ZSTD test. The study concludes 
that since the host market condition is a positive and the post listing abnormal return is a negative 
(post listing anomaly), and the host market condition does not explain the anomaly, and those 
companies time the market, which supports hypothesis; H1A: Some companies time the market. 
 
Table-13. Fama-French Time Series Model 
 
 










Table-14 shows the circumstances in which the host market condition is a negative given by (PM) 
index over the period of (0, +50) and using Fama-French approach instead of risk adjusted market 
returns because FF controls for size and BTM. The paper reports “in the period (11, +50)” the 
average cumulative abnormal is 13.54% and is significant at 0.1% level, for Patel test, TCS, signed 
rank test, a SCT, and, ZSTD test. The study concludes that since the host market condition is a 
negative and the post listing abnormal return is a positive then there is no post listing anomaly. 
Since that the host market condition cannot explain the positive CAAR for those companies. The 
study can conclude that these companies do not time the market because they cannot be timing a 
market that is negative; H1B: Some companies do not time the market. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The study showed that there is no post listing anomaly because the article explained it in the 
context of market timing and host market condition. Why do companies cross-list? The literature 
gives several reasons, but the most prominent of them all is that companies who cross list want to 
maximize their returns. This study confirms previous research that there is a pre-listing run-up in 
price and, hence, an increase in pre-listing returns and confirms that on or around the cross-listing 
date, there are positive returns. However, the research presented evidence that shows that some 
companies’ cross-list based on either a market timing consideration or an actual performance 
consideration. This study elaborated on the former, which is companies cross-list because of 
market timing aspect, and not only did the evidence show that some companies time the market 
while others do not, but also explains the “post listing anomaly”. The sample evidence shows that 
the host market condition plays a pivotal role in answering the combined questions of why 
companies cross-list and why the literature document what so called the “post listing anomaly”.  
On one, hand, the evidence reveals companies that cross-list in a host market while that market 
condition is “positive” and achieve significant negative post listing CAAR are companies that are 
timing the market, and that is why the so called “anomaly” exists. On the other hand, the evidence 
reveals if companies cross-list in a host market while that host market condition is “negative” and 
achieve positive post listing CAAR whether significant or not, then those companies are not timing 
the market, because why would they time a market that is down? Moreover, this demonstrates that 
the “post listing anomaly” does not exist, which indicates that it is not an anomaly. This study 
opens up the field for further research questions, such as does benchmark matter in determining the 
CAAR; does the choice of a different host market index affect the results; is there evidence of 
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